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A B S T R A C T   
Artificial intelligence (AI) has proven to be superior to human decision-making in certain areas. This is partic-
ularly the case whenever there is a need for advanced strategic reasoning and analysis of vast amounts of data in 
order to solve complex problems. Few human activities fit this description better than politics. In politics we deal 
with some of the most complex issues humans face, short-term and long-term consequences have to be balanced, 
and we make decisions knowing that we do not fully understand their consequences. I examine an extreme case 
of the application of AI in the domain of government, and use this case to examine a subset of the potential harms 
associated with algorithmic governance. I focus on five objections based on political theoretical considerations 
and the potential political harms of an AI technocracy. These are objections based on the ideas of ‘political man’ 
and participation as a prerequisite for legitimacy, the non-morality of machines and the value of transparency 
and accountability. I conclude that these objections do not successfully derail AI technocracy, if we make sure 
that mechanisms for control and backup are in place, and if we design a system in which humans have control 
over the direction and fundamental goals of society. Such a technocracy, if the AI capabilities of policy formation 
here assumed becomes reality, may, in theory, provide us with better means of participation, legitimacy, and 
more efficient government.   
1. Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) has proven to be superior to human 
decision-making in certain areas. This is particularly the case whenever 
there is a need for advanced strategic reasoning and analysis of vast 
amounts of data in order to solve complex problems. Few human ac-
tivities fit this description better than politics. In politics we deal with 
some of the most complex issues humans face, short-term and long-term 
consequences have to be balanced, and we make decisions knowing that 
we do not fully understand their consequences. One step at a time, AI has 
conquered realms of great complication, such as chess, Go and the game 
of StarCraft. While these are games, some now suggest that the same 
techniques of machine learning used to conquer such games could also 
be used to conquer politics. One example of this is the suggestion that an 
‘AI Economist’ based on reinforcement learning and multi-layered 
agent-based simulations could make better tax policies, improving pro-
ductivity while simultaneously reducing income inequality [1]. 
In this paper I examine an argument in favour of involving AI in 
political decision-making. This idea is based on the premise of AI’s 
stipulated ability to make better decisions than humans in certain areas, 
and the premise that we ought to implement the best policies possible. 
This is a hypothetical situation in which technologies such as the AI 
economist just discussed are mature, ready for real life applications, and 
functional on a large scale. This is not a technical treatise about AI but an 
analysis of the political theoretical implications of AI in politics. As such, 
I introduce a thought experiment called the magical decision box, which 
is used to test a set of political theoretical arguments for and against an 
AI technocracy. 
There are several approaches to the analysis of the effects of com-
puter decision-making in politics. Algorithmic governance is not an 
entirely new phenomenon, and various harms following the use of AI to 
govern various aspects of human affairs have been examined in much 
detail. There are, amongst other issues, concerns related to issues of 
privacy and surveillance, bias and inequality, transparency and procedure, 
and freedom and autonomy [2,3]. 
Sadowski and Selinger [3] provide a taxonomic tool for technocracy, 
in which they propose categories for the domains, means, and harms of 
technocracy. I limit my examination to the political harms of technoc-
racy. Furthermore, I consider only a subset of the phenomena that are 
analysed in the literature on algorithmic governance, as I focus on the 
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technocracy in the domain of government, and mainly through the means 
of mandates. In addition, my case is one in which the technocracy of AI is 
based on systems with low transparency and high degrees of automation 
[4]. This is a consideration of an extreme case of a technocracy of AI, and 
this case serves well to highlight the political harms to which I limit my 
analysis. These choices make this article a partial contribution to the 
overall consideration of the dangers of technocracy. It is, however, a 
central part, as these dangers have not been sufficiently examined, 
particularly not in the setting of an extreme case of AI technocracy as I 
consider here. 
The political harms I examine are mainly based on ideas from the 
discipline of political theory. The first is that human beings might require 
political activity in order to thrive. If that is the case, the drawbacks of 
technically ‘better’ decisions might outweigh the benefits. The next 
problem is that legitimacy might suffer if people are taken out of politics. I 
will here examine several approaches to this problem, and how it might 
be possible to overcome it through regulation and popular participation 
in guiding computer politics. We could also argue that computers should 
not make decisions that affect citizens’ lives and wellbeing. The fourth 
problem is that we lack transparency when we rely on decisions that are 
beyond the capacity of human reasoning. Without such transparency we 
will be left to conduct politics on the basis of trust in machines. A final 
issue is that of accountability when AI is involved in making political 
decisions. 
However, none of these objections are strong enough to fully debunk 
the argument in favour of employing AI in politics, if a technocracy of AI 
is implemented with a satisfactory system of control, mechanisms of 
backup, and a participatory element. Such a technocracy, if the AI ca-
pabilities of policy formation here assumed becomes reality, may, in 
theory, provide us with better means of participation, fair and impartial 
political outcomes, and more efficient government resulting in benefits 
for most individuals and society in general. 
Should we actually choose to implement a technocracy of AI, politics 
will, and must, change in ways that might both shift its focus and, 
perhaps paradoxically, revitalise democracy and popular participation. 
In an age where algorithms are increasingly governing human action, 
there is a need to openly and carefully consider a) whether we as soci-
eties wish to allow the various forms of algorithmic governance and b) 
how such forms of governance lead to a need to discuss fundamental 
political institutions and arrangements. My main goal with this article is 
to highlight the implications of developments already underway. As 
Sadowski & Selinger [3] point out, governments are increasingly 
opening the door for a) private companies solving public problems, and 
b) the use of AI in government. de Sousa et al. [5] also show how AI is 
now employed in all areas of governments, while recommending that 
implementation of AI in the public sector should be preceded by a 
‘debate with society’ about such applications. AI creep – in the sense that 
AI slowly and almost unnoticeably is applied to ever new areas – if left 
unchecked, might take us to a situation in which we have technocracy of 
AI without either political design or democratic input. I propose that we 
examine the key questions in advance, and prepare our societies for a 
future in which AI has the role we desire it to have in politics. 
I will first develop the concept of traditional technocracy, in order to 
make sense of the logic and potential benefits involved, and the prob-
lems associated with traditional technocracies of humans. I then show 
how AI can, and in many cases already have, taken the role of a tech-
nocrat. Such use of AI is associated with somewhat similar, but not 
identical, risks, to those of traditional technocracy. The combination of 
the concept of technocracy and the use of AI lets me propose a set of 
objections to an AI technocracy based on the idea of political harms, and 
these are first presented and discussed before I move on to the discussion 
of the implications they have, and the potential for a legitimate and 
workable technocracy of AI. 
2. Technocracy, expert rule and democracy 
Schumpeter [6] argues that if we want results that are satisfactory to 
people at large, and judge our governments by such a criterion, gov-
ernment by the people ‘would often fail to meet it’. For us to understand 
what an AI technocracy means, we must understand the basic in-
gredients of technocracy. Sadowski & Selinger [3] are right to call for an 
improved understanding of what technocracy is, and they intend for 
their taxonomy to be a ‘conversation starter’ on the topic of technocratic 
uses of technology. While they argue that it is an ill-defined concept, I 
posit that the solution to this problem is to draw upon the existing 
literature on the subject from the field of political science. Furthermore, 
I reject their implicit position that technocracy is by definition a bad 
thing, associated with harms only, and no benefits. This is based on one 
of the fundamental points in this article, which is that democracy, and 
specific forms of democracy, cannot be assumed to be ultimate goals at 
the outset of an evaluation of the effects of democracy. If we start with 
such an assumption, anything that challenges democracy is by necessity 
bad. A more fruitful approach is to take an agnostic stance to the value of 
democracy. Firstly, this lets us perform an honest and open evaluation of 
alternatives. Secondly, it enables us to strengthen and revitalise de-
mocracy by showing why it is good, and not merely stating that it is. 
2.1. Technocracy and expert rule 
Technocracy is a term that in daily parlance refers to the rule of 
experts. More specifically, I use the term to refer to a state whereby ex-
perts in science and technology – not experts in politics – wield power. 
Technocracy is thus differentiated from other forms of rule by the few, 
such as epistocracy and meritocracy. Epistocracy is a form of government 
whereby those with a particular knowledge of politics rule, and is often 
considered a rule of the wise – those with knowledge of ‘politics, history, 
economics’ [7,8]. This idea is old, and famous political philosophers 
such as Plato [9] and John Stuart Mill [10] have proposed variations of 
it. Meritocracy, on the other hand, is often linked to mental and cognitive 
abilities, regardless of specific knowledge of a particular subject [11,12]. 
Technocracy has been defined in various ways, one being Meynaud’s 
[13] description of ‘a system of governance in which technically trained 
experts rule by virtue of their specialist knowledge and position in 
dominant political and economic institutions’ [13]. The experts, then, 
become technocrats, and have authority based on technical expertise 
[14]. Putnam [15] uses the word technocrat to describe proponents of 
technocracy, whilst I use it to describe technicians in power. 
There are several possible arguments in favour of technocracy, and I 
split them into positive and negative arguments. The negative arguments 
mainly focus on the shortcomings of people and democracy – usually 
implying that the people are unfit to rule, or that democracy itself pro-
duces bad outcomes. The positive arguments chiefly focus on the ben-
efits that could be gained from expert rule, e.g. efficiency, rationality and 
optimisation. It is worth noting that technocracy usually flourish in times 
of panic and great crises, as the need for efficiency and optimal policies 
in such times tend to be more pressing, and obvious [3]. 
The negative arguments are mostly based on the idea that human 
beings are the main problem of politics, and that they are unfit to rule. 
People have personal interests, and they tend to pursue them, even when 
they are tasked with pursuing the public interest [16]. Furthermore, they 
have limited capabilities, in terms both of how much they can do and how 
well they can do things. Some of them have a greater capacity than 
others, however, and this is the foundation of elitist arguments for 
technocracy, for example as seen in Schumpeter [6]. Another class of 
negative arguments focuses on democracy as a system, as it is portrayed 
as inefficient, unjust and prone to instability. 
The positive arguments are mainly based on achieving some form of 
rational optimisation in politics, and partly the belief that most prob-
lems, when properly understood, are technical problems amenable to the 
logic of statistical analysis and optimisation. However, there are also 
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arguments in favour of non-democratic systems based on, for example, 
the idea that markets are the best way to organise everything. At least 
almost everything. And if we do need some form of government, it had 
better be small and kept out of the way [17]. 
A point of great importance is that the technicians do not have all 
power in a technocracy. While a technocratic society delegates much 
authority to their technicians, they are not given the power to determine 
the goals of society. The technocrats are not political or moral experts, 
and I do not consider a situation in which morality and the question of 
political values are reduced to technical questions amenable to the cal-
culus of mathematics and logic. This means that the technocracy I 
discuss have a political apparatus in place for providing the direction for 
society, while the technocrats have the authority to determine and 
effectuate the policies deemed necessary to proceed in the desired di-
rection. This is akin to the process described by Peters [18], where 
technical and political decisions are separated, and the technical issues 
are transferred to "independent agencies, bureaucracies and techno-
cratic elites". Technical issues are also political, however, which is why I 
argue that we have a technocracy of AI when we delegate power to make 
technical decisions to computers. This is the argument made by Næss 
[19], who urges us to see the political nature of all things technical and 
to submit the technical to an evaluation in light of our ultimate values. 
Fischer [20] writes that technocracy revolves around the desire to 
use experts with specific knowledge in positions of political power, for 
the sake of building the ‘good society’. This, then, is not the technocracy 
I discuss, as politicians – or the people – are charged with determining 
what the good society is, while the technocrats are charged with making 
it reality in the most effective manner possible. This is in line with 
Sadowski & Selinger’s [3] picture of technocrats as influential, but still 
largely controlled by elected politicians. This implies a break with the 
understanding of technocracy as an approach in which ‘political realities 
play no role’ [21]. 
2.3. Arguments against technocracy 
Technocracy may have a bad reputation, but it is here given a blank 
slate and the chance to prove any worth it may have. While Sadowski & 
Selinger [3] aim to arm us to ‘combat technocracy’, I claim that we must 
first understand if, and why, it should be combatted. Before moving on 
the use of AI in politics, I present the main traditional arguments against 
technocracy. However, as some of these arguments become less relevant 
if human technocrats are replaced by AI, I do not examine these in great 
detail, unless they remain relevant, and thus become part of the objec-
tion in section 4. 
The arguments against technocracy are also based on various prin-
ciples, and I briefly consider arguments based on the inherent values of 
democracy, human beings’ needs and finally the inherent flaws of 
technocratic government itself. 
Estlund [7] discusses objections to epistocracy, which are partly 
applicable to technocracy as well. The demographic objection is based on 
the fact that giving those with, say, university degrees more voting 
power means giving privilege to certain groups. The second objection – 
the bias objection – is a version of the former, adding the claim that the 
privileged classes, races etc. will exert a certain bias that is unacceptable 
[7,22]. These arguments constitute the first class of arguments against 
technocracy, and I label them the technocrats are people, too arguments. 
One of the arguments in favour of technocracy is that people are flawed, 
but some are less flawed than others. No-one is free of flaws, however, 
and people can never be assumed to have totally overcome irrationality 
and bias. But can computers? I return to this issue in Section 6. It is also 
worth noting at the outset that problems of bias and discrimination are 
not exclusive to the use of algorithms, and in evaluating algorithmic 
governance, we must examine whether algorithmic bias is in fact worse 
than existing problems associated with human bias. 
A second argument against technocracy is based on a concern for 
legitimacy. It posits that technocracy is bad because the process itself 
does not provide legitimacy (only participatory politics does so). This 
constitutes one of the objections discussed in Section 5. 
Thirdly, people might object to technocracy because they believe a 
deliberative process will provide better outcomes. This particularly comes 
from the deliberative-democracy camp [23]. Opposed to these argu-
ments would be ones inspired by Janis [24] and Hobbes [25] who both 
emphasise the dangers inherent in democratic, or group, 
decision-making. It must be added that human technocrats are also 
liable to group-think. 
The fourth argument against technocracy might be called a decen-
tralisation argument. It is the Hayekian notion of dispersed knowledge 
[17]. No human being or small group of human beings can ever amass 
the kind of knowledge that each individual has about their own affairs. 
The only effective way to utilise such knowledge, Hayekians would 
argue, is to give power to the markets [17]. 
The problems of technocracy are not insignificant, but as this ex-
amination shows, there is reason to ask if a technocracy of AI may in fact 
be better than a technocracy of human beings. This stems from the fact 
that several of these arguments more easily applies to human beings 
than to computers. However, as Janssen & Kuk [21] shows, human 
faults are often re-found in the workings of our algorithms, in the form 
of, for example, bias and discrimination. 
2.2.1. The beginnings of a shallow defence of a technocracy of AI 
The title of this article promises a shallow defence of a technocracy of 
AI. This refers to the argument I will construct in the first part of the 
article, which consists of three proposition that lead to the conclusion 
that we should employ AI in politics, and erect a technocracy of AI. This 
argument will then be subjected to a set of objections to such a tech-
nocracy in section 4. The first two components of the shallow defence 
follow form the preceding consideration on technocracy and politics. 
First of all, politics can be understood as a process aimed at imple-
menting the best possible policies. But what policy is considered best 
can, of course, only be decided once we know what criteria to apply. 
Thus, the first and fundamental purpose of politics is to develop and 
elucidate what fundamental moral values a society is based on. Only then 
can politics as we know it in the day-to-day workings of society take 
place. And only then can we properly assess the value of technology 
[19]. This is the first building block in the defence of an AI technocracy: 
Policies should be evaluated on the basis of the fundamental moral 
values of the society in question, and finding these values is the first 
purpose of politics. 
Furthermore, if politics revolves around the question of finding the 
best policies, as Schumpeter [6] implies, we also have a second premise 
in the establishment of what will become the defence: 
The best policies in accordance with the evaluation discussed in the 
first premise should be implemented. 
3. Artificial intelligence and political decision-making 
Artificial intelligence is superior to human intelligence for analysis of 
large and complex problems involving the need for strategy, prediction 
of long-term effects and analysis of vast amounts of data. One example is 
playing chess and Go [26–29]. However, AI can beat humans at more 
than fun and games. Politics is complex, and it involves many consid-
erations of notoriously uncertain short- and long-term consequences. As 
the literature on algorithmic governance shows, AI is already employed 
in many facets of government, as I show in section 3.1. 
I will note at the outset that the potential benefits from AI in politics 
is heavily contested [4]. I agree with the idea that AI as of today is not 
some silver bullet that can be employed in order to create flourishing 
societies. However, as the many existing applications clearly show, there 
is undeniably a potential for the beneficial use of AI in politics. I will 
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assume that some of this potential can be realised, and that we will 
continue to see certain improvements in the technologies involved. This 
means that I consider possible near-future technologies, and not spec-
ulative developments related to some form of singularity, etc. [29]. 
I will not discuss the technologies involved in great detail, but rely on 
the assumption that much of the future applications of AI is based on the 
technologies currently employed. de Sousa et al. [5] chart the technol-
ogies most often employed in public sector AI; various forms of machine 
learning are used, while artificial neural networks (ANN) is the most 
popular technique in terms of usage. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) 
imitate biological information-processing systems, and consist of artifi-
cial neurons that transmit signals to each other in reinforcement sys-
tems, for example [30]. Deep learning is our term for deeply layered 
neural networks, and this is the machine learning approach used by the 
AI economist I use as an example, as well as by Google’s AlphaGo and 
AlphaZero [31,28,32,1]. 
3.1. AI and expertise in questions of policy 
Algorithmic governance is a term describing the utilisation of algo-
rithms both in ordering human action in general, and in traditional 
political structures [33,4]. As such, it is a very broad term, and as dis-
cussed in the introduction, I only focus on a subset of what is referred to 
in general as algorithmic governance. Using the taxonomic tools of 
Sadowski & Selinger [3], I limit my discussion to the use of AI in the 
domain of government, and mainly to a situation in which AI is given the 
authority to govern by mandates (not more informal nudging, or even less 
direct governing through technological mediation). 
According to the same typology, I mainly focus on a specific set of 
harms, labelled political harms. These are distinguished from existential 
and discursive harms [3]. Existential harms relate to the reduction of 
individuals through the datafication and behaviouristic approach to the 
control of human beings. Discursive harms involve the restriction of 
discourse through a domination by technocratic ideas. In this article, I 
do not focus on harms related to privacy and surveillance or bias, un-
fairness and inequality. A potential loss of freedom is another potential 
harm that falls beyond the scope of the article [2]. 
Issues of privacy and surveillance are of great importance, but I will 
in the following assume that AI can be built on data which is not indi-
vidualized, and that it does not govern by individualized nudges or 
micro-directives, etc., based on detailed personality profiles [34,35]. 
Hypothetically, policy could also be based on machine learning in 
combination with simulations, such as in the example of the AI econo-
mist [1]. Related to issues of privacy are issues of agency, autonomy and 
freedom [2,4]. Another point is that increased used of data, and the 
translation of all aspects of human action into data is that such quanti-
fication by necessity involves multiple stages of human interpretation, 
challenging the objective veneer of big data-based decision making [21, 
34,36]. Such issues are only partially considered in this article, and will 
thus remain important philosophical issues for further research. 
Some of the potential harms that I do not focus on, fall in the cate-
gories of unforeseen and unintended consequences [4]. One such 
problem is algorithmic bias and resulting issues of fairness and inequality 
[5]. Furthermore, algorithms, partly because of problems associated 
with the training data, could also favour particular political ideologies, 
and they could reinforce discriminatory and other undesirable practices 
[21]. These problems are real, and important, and any technocracy of AI 
must implement mechanisms of algorithmic oversight in order to 
address such problems. However, I do not consider these challenges in 
detail in the present article, and employing the thought experiment 
presented in section 3.2 enables me to isolate the political harms I do 
focus on from the issues of algorithmic bias. 
According to Sadowski and Selinger [3], political harms relate to 
people being disenfranchised and deprived of political power and in-
fluence. This relates to the potential de-politicisation effects of algo-
rithmic governance [4]. In addition to this, questions of transparency and 
procedure are relevant to the analysis of political harms [2]. These 
concerns are examined in more detail in section 4. 
With regard to the applications of AI, I posit that we have already 
moved a long way towards AI decision making, and this is an important 
point to keep in mind when we consider the technocracy of AI. As I will 
show, a condemnation of the technocracy of AI that I propose will in 
many respects simultaneously involve a condemnation of many current 
practices. 
AI is now used in all areas of society: driving cars, guiding our mis-
siles, trading stocks, helping us navigate new places, playing chess, 
recognising speech, speaking to us, finding our mates, forecasting the 
weather, etc. [37]. AI is even used to determine who gets bail and who 
gets loans and identify likely tax evaders [37,38]. All these applications 
of AI are relevant to an examination of algorithmic governance in gen-
eral, but not all of them are in the domain of government. 
de Sousa et al. [5] provide a thorough account of current applications 
of AI in the public sector. They find that it is employed in all areas of 
government already, while general public service, economic affairs and 
environmental protection is the areas most emphasized in the literature on 
AI in government. Examples of current applications are found in most 
functions of the public sector, such as public health, transportation, 
education, security, communications, and the actual examples involve, 
amongst others, systems of identification of risks, optimisation systems, 
systems for response, analysis and prediction [5]. Predictive policing is 
another area that has gotten a lot of attention, and AI is also used in, for 
example, the administration of immigration and in calculating social 
benefits [21,4] 
Algorithmic control of traffic lights and speed limits is one low level 
example in the domain of transportation, where the utility of having 
dynamic systems based on machine learning could increase efficiency 
and utility [34]. If the objective of our traffic lights and speed limits is to 
a) optimise traffic flow while b) minimising casualties, AI could most 
likely improve a static system of pre-determined speed limits – allowing 
for increased speed in low danger situations and not having drivers wait 
unnecessarily at red lights. The idea is that similar benefits could be 
reaped in other domains of law and politics, such as tax policies [1]. 
Another example would be the use of AI to implement optimal strategies 
for pandemic response, which could involve using AI to predict and 
identify outbreaks and dynamically apply the optimal response based on 
a society’s tolerance for risks weighed against other factors, such as 
economic costs. 
In general, when we face optimisation problems, AI could have the 
potential to aid us. Most problems of politics are highly complicated 
optimisation problems. As long as we have a goal, AI can in theory take 
us there in an effective manner. Furthermore, it could continuously 
experiment, and could update its policies. Policies would be dynamic, 
always responding to changes in human preferences and behaviour. One 
recent example is the AI economist which can make tax policies, in a 
simulation, that both improve productivity and decrease inequality [1]. 
Another is the use of WeBuildAI, which through participatory algo-
rithmic design managed to increase efficiency of a food donation 
transportation service while simultaneously improving the perceived 
fairness of the outcome – adjudicating equity and efficiency [39]. Such 
examples are limited and hypothetical, but, in combination with the 
many existing applications, they suggest that we could in time find us in 
a situation where such systems are applicable to real-world large-scale 
situations. 
3.2. The magical decision box and whether or not to use it 
One way to approach this issue without getting lost in the technical 
aspects of AI is to consider an analogy. I invite you to replace AI as we 
know it with a hypothetical device called the magical decision box 
(MDB). This thought experiment requires you to accept that a society 
has discovered a box – origins unknown – that makes decisions. The box 
accepts input and constraints, it accepts goals and it provides answers. 
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Through rigorous tests the society in question has found that the box 
significantly outperforms human experts in making policies that opti-
mise the goals it has been given. Thus far they have found no major 
errors. Despite their very best efforts, they have not been able to un-
derstand how the box works, and they cannot recreate (even in retro-
spect) the ways in which the box reasons. The decisions, however, are 
good, so should they employ it? 
The MDB is, of course, different from AI in many ways. However, 
there are certain similarities that might elucidate the core issues 
involved in the objections to AI in politics. Like the MDB, AI is a ‘black 
box’ that we do not always fully understand. Even if we understand the 
principles involved in making advanced machine learning models, they 
will produce outcomes that we often cannot predict [21]. I will later 
return to the notion of explainable, or explicable, AI – also referred to as 
XAI [40,41]. 
The realist theory of democracy and both cognitive and behavioural 
science have shown many of the shortcomings of human decision- 
making. This brings me to the next proposition in the argument lead-
ing to the preliminary conclusion that artificial intelligence should be 
used to improve political decisions. This could come about in several 
ways, ranging from computers aiding human decision-makers to their 
replacing them. I here examine the latter possibility, which I call an AI 
technocracy. 
We now have the option of letting computers make expert judge-
ments for us. With the use of advanced machine learning, computers 
could make better decisions than human beings. Vogl et al. [42] argue 
that computers might improve decision-making by overcoming the 
human limitations of bounded rationality and information processing. 
Machines are better than us at chess and Go, and if this ability also 
applies to other well-defined strategic problems, should we not let 
computers decide for us? If we had the MDB, and knew that its results 
were good, would we use it? 
3.2.1. The third premise – AI supremacy 
The possibility of AI superiority in solving complex issues related to 
human beings and their societies is not out of the question. As my goal is 
to analyse the possible future impact of AI on politics, the exact prob-
ability of this happening, or the exact scope of AI superiority, is of less 
importance. For these reasons, we can consider AI to be the MDB for our 
present purposes. What matters is that for now we should accept the 
premise that AI might in the future play the part I am proposing here. If 
this does not happen, or until it happens, this paper can be considered 
null and void, and no harm should have occurred. To be clear, I do not 
believe AI can currently be the basis of a full technocracy such as the one 
I here describe. 
Artificial Intelligence is better than humans at finding and enacting 
the best policies in certain areas concerning science, engineering and 
complex societal and macroeconomic issues 
With this, the shallow defence of an AI technocracy is complete. Firstly, 
the purpose of politics is to find the best policies, in accordance with 
some set moral basis. Secondly, we should enact the best policies we 
have identified. Thirdly, AI is better than human beings at creating and 
identifying the best policies. All this leads to the preliminary conclusion 
that AI should be given the power to discover and enact our policies. 
4. The potential arguments against a AI technocracy 
It seems non-controversial to assume that such a technocracy could 
in certain areas give us better decisions in terms of efficiency, utility or 
whatever other criteria we set as the computer’s goal. Lee et al. [39] and 
Zheng [1] provides proofs of concept for the idea that AI could provide 
both efficiency and still be amenable to popular control and direction. 
However, there are also several potential downsides, which will have 
to be weighed up against these benefits. I will here provide a schematic 
overview of some of the obvious objections to an AI technocracy, based 
on the political harms it may cause. They are: a) people might need 
politics, b) legitimacy is linked to democracy, c) AI is not capable of 
morality, d) we have an issue with transparency related to AI and e) AI 
decision-making involves problems assigning responsibility. 
Note that I am not considering the objection that such a technocracy 
would not lead to better policies, as this very premise is part of the 
argument I am testing. If this premise fails, the argument in favour of 
technocracy crumbles, and there is little need for any of these objections. 
Accepting the first three premises for now, I proceed to the political 
theoretical objections against the shallow argument in favour of an AI 
technocracy. In this brief examination of the objections I will first pre-
sent each objection, and then some considerations concerning its 
possible shortcomings. 
4.1. Human nature and homo politicus 
According to Aristotle [43], humans are political animals. The best 
that they can achieve is to exercise their political capabilities and live a 
life of self-determination in a political society. Only then will they 
realise their true nature – their telos. 
4.1.1. The first objection – people’s political nature 
People need full political participation in order to be satisfied 
This is, however, only one of the interpretations of Aristotle’s view of 
humans and politics. Mulgan [44] shows that Aristotle can also be un-
derstood as supporting ‘the withdrawal from politics, or at least reluc-
tant participation’. In both The Politics and Ethics the philosopher’s 
lifestyle is portrayed as being superior to the life of the statesman [44]. 
Another immediate objection would be to ask: Are people politically 
active in today’s political systems? What will really change if AI makes 
our decisions, instead of bureaucrats? The ‘political animal’ argument is 
against any move from direct democracy towards democracy by repre-
sentation or republicanism, and this move could be said to be a neces-
sary evil if we are to have large-scale, complex societies. 
This objection also relies on an agreement with Aristotle’s hierar-
chical ordering of human activities. Other philosophies, such as hedo-
nism, could easily portray a life of increased wealth and leisure as a 
potential improvement to a life material hardship and political activity. 
Philosophers such as F. A. Hayek have proposed that involvement in 
politics is not that important, and that economic liberty is what is 
essential to good societies [17]. Following this argument, he states that 
democracy is not necessarily the best way to rule, and that ‘… a de-
mocracy may well wield totalitarian powers, and it is conceivable that 
an authoritarian government may act on liberal principles’ [17]. 
However, a crucial point of this article is that a technocracy of AI 
may in fact lead to a revitalization of popular participation and the 
accessibility of the political domain. Through new ways of participation, 
such as algorithmic co-creation, we could find ourselves in a situation in 
which most people have, and experience, more political power than they 
do today. This is examined in more detail in the next objection. 
4.2. Legitimacy and democracy 
Another objection is that people need to be involved, and that they 
need deliberation to take place if political systems are to have legitimacy 
[45,46]. Even if the best decisions were made by a dictator, his decisions 
would not be legitimate if the citizens had no political power. We thus 
distinguish between legitimate authority and effective authority. AI might 
be extremely effective, but might still lack legitimacy. 
We can see this objection as consisting of two parts: a) policy should 
be decided by the populace, and b) all citizens should have equal political 
rights and a realistic chance of exercising them. The objection to tech-
nocracy would be that legitimacy is lost when the population is deprived 
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of crucial political rights and the ability to take part in decision-making. 
This objection is based on a procedural view of legitimacy [47]. Ac-
cording to such a view, due process is the source of legitimacy, and 
deliberation is one aspect of such a process [45]. 
4.2.1. The second objection – legitimacy based on participation 
People will not deem a government in which they do not participate 
to be legitimate 
The counterobjections are similar to those regarding the previous 
objection. We could first argue that an AI technocracy makes people 
more equal than they would have been in any democracy – equally free 
to participate in the moral debates about the direction of society, and 
equally deprived of participation in policy formation. We might also 
argue that such a system would enable people to understand more about 
politics, and that the barrier to understanding politics and taking part 
would be lowered. When human politics only revolves around funda-
mental moral values, it is easier to both understand and take part in this 
process. 
Furthermore, not everyone agrees that legitimacy is gained through 
participation. For Hobbes [24]; legitimacy is achieved through the social 
contract, which ensures that a government – by one, few, many or all – is 
created to satisfy everyone’s fundamental need, this need being security 
– sometimes labelled liberty [45]. K€onig [48] even discusses how algo-
rithmic governance bears some resemblance to Hobbes’s apolitical Levi-
athan. If democracy contributes to better political outcomes, it is 
conducive to legitimacy. If it does not, it is not necessary [49]. The latter 
argument is the instrumental view of democracy. 
Even in today’s societies participation in politics is restricted to a 
select few, despite everyone having a theoretical chance of taking part. 
The size and complexity of our societies have led to the growth of bu-
reaucracies, expert rule and indirect democracy. Going from this to an AI 
technocracy is perhaps not as radical as it might seem at first sight. 
One obvious potential benefit of digitalisation and the increased 
capacity to communicate using digital tools is the possibility of directly 
involving far more people in political processes. The Pirate Party is an 
example of an actual attempt at this, and they have done very well in 
several countries [50]. 
If a technocracy of AI is to overcome this objection, participation in 
some form must be ensured. One way to implement this is to promote co- 
creation and ‘democratizing algorithm’ [21]. One such example is the 
WeBuildAI example, which shows several methods of popular partici-
pation in the creation and design of algorithms, and how this could lead 
to both increased participation and increased algorithmic awareness 
[39]. This also addresses a potential objection based on the idea that 
only democracy has the pedagogical effects ensuing from participation 
in politics. People learn from taking part in politics [46,51]. According to 
this argument, the beneficial effects participation has on people could 
outweigh the negative effects of having sub-optimal policies. However, 
if systems such as WeBuildAI allows for participation and efficiency, 
there is little reason to choose sub-optimality. 
4.3. Machines, morality and human wellbeing 
Another possible counterargument against the use of AI in politics is 
based on the argument that politics always involves questions of values 
and morality. This is not necessarily a problem per se, but it creates an 
obstacle for AI as soon as we run into people arguing that morality is 
solely a human endeavour. According to some people moral machines 
do not exist, and human qualities such as compassion and wisdom are 
crucial prerequisites for important decisions [52]. 
Resolving this question entails coming to some sort of agreement 
about how we define morality, and whether or not our definitions 
exclude machines. What we are concerned with here is whether or not 
machines can act morally and make moral decisions. In the terminology 
of ethics: whether or not they can be moral agents [53]. 
4.3.1. The third objection – morality 
Computers should not make decisions that affect people’s lives and 
wellbeing 
Some people believe that we can train a machine to become moral, e. 
g. by having a lot of people answer various questions on the morally 
superior decision in various instances of the trolley problem. The Moral 
Machine is one such endeavour that has attracted much attention [54]. It 
is an attempt to crowd-source the morality of people around the world in 
order to teach a computer to distinguish right from wrong, in order to 
find ethical principles to guide machine behaviour. This is an approach 
which could be related to the approach of WeBuildAI, in which social 
choice theory and popular participation is used to train algorithms [39]. 
Kurzweil [29] predicts that machines will gain human proficiencies 
and capabilities, including morality-related emotions. Maldonato and 
Valerio [55] and Scheutz [56] also discuss related topics, e.g. machines 
with value systems and the creation of machines with moral compe-
tences. Even if they do not gain anything akin to human morality, ma-
chines are becoming better at understanding human morality, as it can 
quantify, track and compare moral bias, for example, ‘across cultures 
and over time’ [57]. 
However, we could also approach this objection more pragmatically. 
If we decide that decisions that affect people’s wellbeing require moral 
capabilities, we are already employing AI in situations where it does not 
belong. Self-driving cars could not then be allowed. Robots trading in 
markets would become highly problematic. Use of AI to determine 
whether or not criminal offenders should receive bail would be highly 
dubious. 
AI is already involved in moral decisions in countless ways, and our 
current approach to this issue is to make someone other than the com-
puter itself morally responsible for the decisions made. We will include 
the premise in the tentative discussion, but I will argue in the conclusion 
that this objection is better understood by way of handling objection 5 
and the attribution of AI decisions. 
Another obvious counterobjection would be that if machines cannot 
be moral, neither can they be immoral. To some people this situation 
would appear to be a huge advantage compared with the capacities of 
today’s politicians. If indeed power corrupts, we should see it as an 
advantage that AI has no morally corruptible nature [58]. 
A different kind of objection would be that the important issue is not 
morality but whether or not machines are able to act ethically. If morality 
is right action based on some internal value system, then ethics are ac-
tions based on some external system. Machines’ ability to act in accor-
dance with humans’ codes of ethics might be sufficient. Following this 
objection, one could also question the nature of human morality itself, 
and portraying morality as some vague and unscientific idea, plagued by 
no consensus, which is thus of little interest. We might even object that 
we have no test for the morality of our human politicians, so why should 
we implement one in order to keep robots away from power? 
4.4. Transparency and the problem of understanding what we cannot 
produce ourselves 
Human experts can explain their choices to the populace in a way 
that computers cannot – at least not yet. And even if they become better 
at explaining why certain choices are made, will we be able to under-
stand? The reason for giving computers the authority to decide is that 
they are able to make evaluations and calculations that are beyond 
human capacity. 
Transparency would then be an issue, and we might be left guessing 
why our AI technocrat made the decisions it made, in the same way as 
chess experts guess why the computer calls moves good or bad when 
analysing the world’s best players. Santiago [59] emphasises that 
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humans must have the last say in decisions made by AI. However, if we 
cannot understand the reasoning behind the decisions, transparency and 
control are hard to achieve [21]. Opacity is one of Danaher’s [37] main 
objections to algorithmic governance. 
4.4.1. The fourth objection – transparency 
AI is not transparent and thus not fully amenable to human control 
Pressure is mounting, Wachter et al. [60] state, to make sure that AI 
becomes explainable, and thus transparent. Explainable AI (XAI) is the 
quest for machines that can make us understand their decisions and 
reasoning. Such a development could make us trust, understand and 
manage AI decision makers [40]. This is a field that receives a lot of 
attention, but until we have achieved this goal, we could imagine other 
ways of dealing with the problem. 
Like with the magical decision box, which is by definition unfath-
omable, we must perhaps rely on control by goal achievement and 
observable result parameters with AI technocracy. If AI or the MDB 
make decisions that take us closer to our goals, do we really need to 
understand how they manage to do so? Similarly, if the bureaucrats 
make decisions beyond politicians’ understanding, do we complain? We 
might simply recognise that the very reason politicians rely on experts, 
or AI technocrats, is because the latter make decisions that are unfath-
omable, owing to their being too advanced. Lack of understandability is 
the price for better decisions. In the words of Robbins [41], ‘a principle 
of explicability for AI makes the use of AI redundant’. Janssen & Kuk 
[21] is right in arguing that a full understanding of how complex algo-
rithms operate is most likely restricted to the ‘happy few’. However, so is 
a full understanding of how many current systems of government 
operates. 
Danaher [37] does not see this counterobjection as a valid reason for 
ignoring transparency issues. The fact that we have similar problems 
today, he argues, is not a reason to allow them (in more serious form) in 
algorithmic governance. I am, however, not arguing that an AI tech-
nocracy is an ideal system. I merely argue that it could be argued to be 
better than what we currently have. As such, the pragmatic counterar-
guments pointing out that an AI technocracy does not lead to a wors-
ening compared to current affairs is of a great interest. If AI technocracy 
leads to a pareto improvement where efficiency is improved, while other 
aspects of political life remain the same, I will consider this desirable. 
A related point is that opacity could provide certain benefits. If the 
exact workings of a system is not known, it is difficult to game the system 
[21]. However, the AI economist of Zheng et al. [1] allows for such 
gaming of the tax system, and find their policy maker capable of coping 
with it. 
4.5. Who is responsible when a computer makes decisions? 
The final objection is based on the problem of accountability. If a 
computer makes a decision, who is held accountable for this decision? 
Until we are willing to consider robots legal persons with rights and 
obligations, someone else must be held accountable for their actions. But 
who? Their authors, or perhaps their owners, who are responsible for 
using them? 
The accountability gap is a term used to describe such issues, and it is 
a problem that becomes increasingly prominent as our technologies 
become more advanced and capable [60]. This complexity creates sit-
uations in which the creator of a machine cannot foresee the actions of 
his creation [61]. When this happens, some perceieve a gap between 
who acts (for example, a complex machine), and who is perceived as 
responsible (the creator). 
4.5.1. The fifth objection – accountability 
Accountability regarding the consequences of political decisions 
must be clear, and it becomes less clear when AI makes decisions 
Santiago [59] states that when businesses employ AI in 
decision-making, humans must have the final say. But which humans, 
when we are discussing AI technocracy? We are not discussing a political 
system in which bureaucracy is simply replaced by AI, but one in which 
the technocrat machines are given greater autonomy in terms of policy 
formation. Thus, the current system, whereby politicians are responsible 
for the decisions of their bureaucracies, will not work, as they will not be 
assumed to be in control of their technocrats as they now are of their 
bureaucrats. 
We might not have any perfect solutions to this problem, but one 
might also argue that neither are popular modern political systems 
perfect. We do, however, have several options. One is to hold the pro-
ducers of AI legally responsible for their artificial technocrats. 
Another possibility could be to create a human council for machine 
control, tasked with making sure our technocrats do as we wish. Algo-
rithmic ‘constituents’, Binns [62] argues, have a right to scrutinise and 
hold someone accountable for the exercise of algorithmic governance. 
As Janssen & Kuk [21] point out, few are able to exercise such control. 
Educating the population and organising such a council for machine 
control is a vital precondition for an AI technocracy, as I will return to 
later. 
5. The pros and cons of an AI technocracy 
The shallow argument in favour of an AI technocracy is based on 
three premises.  
� P1: Policies should be evaluated on the basis of the fundamental moral 
values of the society in question, and ascertaining these values is the first 
purpose of politics.  
� P2: The best policies in accordance with the evaluation discussed in 
the first premise should be implemented.  
� P3: Artificial Intelligence is better than humans at finding and 
enacting the best policies in certain areas concerning science, engi-
neering and complex societal and macroeconomic issues 
I have argued that these premises could be used to construct a shallow 
defence of an AI technocracy. Shallow, because until we deal with the 
five important objections the argument is not complete, and AI tech-
nocracy is only one of several possible conclusions. The objections I 
consider are:  
� O1: People need full political participation in order to be satisfied  
� O2: People will not deem a government in which they do not 
participate to be legitimate  
� O3: Computers should not make decisions affecting people’s lives and 
wellbeing  
� O4: AI is not transparent and thus not fully amenable to human control  
� O5: Accountability regarding the consequences of political decisions 
must be clear, and it becomes less clear when AI makes decisions 
5.1. The strength of the objections 
Where, then, does this lead us? Firstly, if O1 or O2 is true, the 
argument in favour of technocracy is weakened. We might, however, 
introduce a counterobjection, to remove some of the sting of these two 
objections. If politics is really about deciding which moral values are 
important, and what we see as the good society, having a policy process 
whereby human beings take part in the formulation of these issues is 
compatible with a technocracy. 
H.S. Sætra                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Technology in Society 62 (2020) 101283
8
I will even argue that it is necessary in order to avoid a technocracy 
with no goal or direction. If this counterobjection is accepted O1 and O2 
can be disregarded. However, O1 states that people require full partic-
ipation, and this condition might not be satisfied by my proposed policy 
process involving only fundamental values. However, objection 1 could 
conceivable also strengthen the initial argument in defence of an AI 
technocracy. While Danaher [37] argues that algorithmic governance 
will tend to limit and reduce the possibilities of participation, my 
argument in favour of reorienting the goal of politics to fundamental 
values could make it more accessible. 
O3 is an objection that sounds both true and reasonable, but let us 
consider the implications before accepting it. If we take it as it stands, AI 
must not be used in any area where human wellbeing is affected – not in 
determining loans, not in determining bail, and not even in helping us 
identify criminals, or in areas such as financial fraud. Furthermore, 
positive use of AI affects people’s wellbeing just as much as use that we 
more often perceive to be problematic. This means that autonomous 
vehicles are most certainly out of the question, and even brake assist etc. 
must be got rid of. 
The implications are absurd, which implies that we must subject the 
objection to close scrutiny. Some use of technology is unavoidable if we 
are not to reject all the assistance it currently provides us with. When we 
pursue this issue, we find that all technologies have moral and political 
implications, which means that the issue at hand is not really restricted to 
the use of AI. The important issue, I argue, is accountability, which will be 
discussed shortly. 
The proposition that AI should not make decisions because the de-
cisions are not transparent (O4) is a universal problem associated with 
letting those with the most knowledge make decisions. It is, however, 
possible to imagine a situation whereby decisions are explained by virtue 
of the results they lead to. How economists arrive at a new and better tax 
system is perhaps of less interest than their proposal showing what a new 
tax system will lead to. Politicians will not understand the technical 
aspects of the reasoning, just as they will not understand the processes 
that lead the AI from input to ideal policies. This problem is not 
restricted to the use of AI. 
I argue that AI is transparent, but that we simply have a hard time 
understanding how known methods and known input lead to decisions 
that are better than those we could make ourselves. If nothing is hidden 
or secret, a decision is by definition transparent, and whilst further work 
on explainable AI will be beneficial, Objection 4 does not appear to be 
particularly strong. 
This issue of transparency is a problem in two respects. It is a chal-
lenge to the legitimacy of an AI technocracy, and people might not be 
willing to take the risk involved in being ruled by something one cannot 
understand. With human politicians we realise we may be taking a de-
gree of risk, as human fallibility is well known. It is, however, harder to 
identify the risks involved in computer decisions, and the fear that it will 
err in ways we will not be able to uncover, or correct, is different from 
the risk of being ruled by fallible leaders who are just like us. Further-
more, if we develop and apply methods of participation and co-creation, 
we could increase general algorithmic awareness. This might hypo-
thetically lead to most people having a better understanding of how our 
societies function than they do today. 
Accountability issues are the fifth objection, and I have proposed that 
either a council for oversight or the producers of the AI systems could be 
held accountable. It is not a problem per se if we refuse to give AI moral 
agency, and thus moral responsibility and accountability. An AI tech-
nocracy need not be unlimited and arbitrary. It could be a constitu-
tionally limited AI whereby a council – small or large – of men is tasked 
with giving the AI both a direction and a goal. 
5.2. Discussion 
AI is in certain respects like a modern-day version of Leibniz’s God — 
the good architect who must be assumed to have created the best 
possible version of the universe [63]. Had we known what God knows, 
we would realise that the universe is as good as it can be, despite oc-
currences of what we perceive as evil. The argument works as long as 
you believe in an almighty and good God, and this kind of trust must 
thus be transferred to AI. 
This takes us back to the magical decision box. If we knew it had 
always produced good decisions in the past, should we employ it, even if 
we did not understand how it worked? We would be in a situation 
similar to the one Leibniz considers when examining whether or not the 
world is good. God is good, and God created it, thus the world must be 
good, even if it may not always seem that way to us. 
If God created the magical decision box, I argue that we should 
employ it as our technocrat. However, as my analysis suggests, we 
should perhaps not discard the use of AI as our technocrat even if it is not 
a magical and perfect decision box. There are, however preconditions 
that must be satisfied for such a technocracy to be able to overcome the 
objections I have presented. Furthermore, the defence of a technocracy 
of AI here presented is shallow also in the sense that not all objections 
and considerations have been considered. The future capabilities of AI 
are somewhat speculative, I have not gone into detail on issues of bias, 
discrimination, agency, and liberty, and it remains to be seen if the 
world of wicked political problems is truly amenable to the optimising 
hand of artificial intelligence [64]. Nevertheless, I do propose a defence 
that is not without value, as it suggests that the political harms of an AI 
technocracy are not insurmountable. 
One of the preconditions for a technocracy of AI is that there are 
backup and control mechanisms in place, in case the AI systems should 
fail, or if we desire to scale back the use of AI. Control systems are 
necessary in order to supervise the performance of the systems, and 
particularly to monitor potential issues related to bias, discrimination, 
and various other unintended consequences. Furthermore, times of cri-
ses and rapid change have shown that machine learning systems can 
easily become confounded, and in such cases, there must be mechanisms 
in place for human intervention. This was shown clearly during the 
Covid-19 situation that led to problems for many machine learning 
models trained on ‘normal behaviour’ [65]. 
Putting AI in power involves, in a certain sense, putting the com-
panies and individuals that create these systems in power [37]. Some 
people might argue that the creators are simply creating algorithms – 
just doing maths and creating abstract and valueless systems. Dwork & 
Mulligan [66], however, point out that any such system is bound to 
reflect some of the implicit ideas and values of its creators. Whilst this 
might occur by pure accident, despite the intentions of the designers, 
Gillespie [67] points out that most of the creators of such systems have 
clear profit-maximisation goals. Such goals and accompanying in-
centives might make it difficult for us to regard AI as an equivalent to 
Leibniz’s God. Griffy Brown et al. [68] note the profit-driven technocratic 
ideology, which is different from the disinterested and scientific tech-
nocratic ideal I previously described. These considerations show that a 
robust system of algorithmic supervision is required whenever the AI in 
question is a human creation, and not a magical decision box. 
Another precondition is some form of political control of the core 
values and direction of society. One possibility is to simply scale back, 
but largely keep, the current system of representative democracy. This 
involves a limitation of the scope of politics, as the technocrats have 
authority over many issues of policy. Another, and more radical possi-
bility, is to pursue some of the new modes of popular participation and 
popular government provided by new technologies. 
Much research focuses on the possibilities of using technology to 
facilitate participation, and Janssen & Kuk [21] call for democratizing 
algorithms. I have focused on the WeBuildAI example in this article, 
which points toward the potential for massive popular participation in 
the shaping of algorithms and the potential of increasing popular un-
derstanding of AI [39]. This latter option, while more radical, also shows 
how a technocracy of AI could in fact increase people’s opportunities for 
political participation, rather than the opposite. While doing so, it could 
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also meet the demands for involving various stakeholders and social 
groups in political decision making. If this is not enough, increasing 
broad participation in political also allows us to reap the benefits of 
dispersed knowledge and decentralised markets, as emphasized by 
Hayek [17]. 
6. Conclusion 
The benefits of better political decisions are considerable. I have 
shown that AI is already being employed in the public sector in order to 
improve political analysis and decisions, and that it will become ever 
more capable. If we agree that politics should have good policy as a goal, 
and if we do not consider our current democratic order as a given and 
inviolable good, we start opening the door to the idea that AI should 
have political power. 
In this article I have focused on the potential widespread application 
of AI in the domain of government, and I have examined an extreme case 
in which AI is given the authority to form policy. This is done through 
systems characterised by low transparency, high complexity and high 
degrees of automation. As such, the situation is rigged to trigger the 
alarms of those concerned with democracy, participation and the polit-
ical harms of algorithmic governance. 
I have chosen to focus mainly on a set of harms perceived as vital 
from a political science stance, while acknowledging that other impor-
tant harms are both important and necessary for acquiring a complete 
picture. However, all the harms from and objection to an AI technocracy 
cannot not be discussed in the required detail in one article. As such, my 
account is a partial one which must be seen in combination with detailed 
accounts of the harms related to bias, discrimination, autonomy, etc. 
However, the political harms are vital, and not as often discussed in 
detail as some of the other harms, which makes this an important part of 
a full understanding of the consequences of algorithmic governance. 
Through five objections, based on participation, legitimacy, non- 
morality of machines, transparency and accountability, I have reached 
the conclusion that an AI technocracy is not derailed by such objections. 
If, that is, certain preconditions are met. 
An AI technocracy capable of overcoming the objections discussed 
must involve some way of making sure that humans retain the power to 
define the fundamental goal of politics – that of deciding what our 
fundamental values are, and how we imagine the good society. If humans 
retain this role, and make sure that the process is a democratic one, both 
participation and legitimacy might be preserved. Furthermore, I have 
argued that the non-morality of machines is not a problem if we assign 
responsibility either to the proposed democratic council of values and AI 
control or to the producers of AI. 
AI is in some respects like the magical decision box. If we had such a 
device, we could employ it, and over time we would might to trust that 
its decisions were good – like Leibniz’s God. If the MDB were a mystical 
device, not one created by humans, there would be, I argue, no reason 
for any particular group of people to object to its rule. While there are 
many reasons to be wary of an AI technocracy of human origins, it is 
time we take the possibility seriously. Firstly, because we are already 
seeing the application of AI in many areas of the public sector, without a 
full and open debate about the desirability and implications of such a 
development. Secondly, we must take the possibility seriously, as I have 
shown that it has the potential to revitalise democracy, increasing public 
participation in politics, and provide more efficient outcomes. 
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